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ABSTRACT
Modern secularism, as theorized by prominent liberal philosophers such as John Rawls and
Jürgen Habermas, prescribes that the state should treat all religions equally on condition that they
and their adherents relinquish their theocratic aspirations and recognize the political sovereignty
and superiority of man-made law. Convinced that the secular bargain undermines the moral
virtue of society and its members, a small, fragmented, but nevertheless conspicuous number of
Islamists in Europe prefers to observe Islamic law in all walks of life, private and public.
Alarmed by Islamists and informed by Orientalist readings of Islam, an increasingly vehement
and vociferous contingent of Islamophobes avers that Islam is inherently incompatible with
democracy and urges European governments to treat neither Islam nor Muslims equally, but
rather suspiciously as real or potential threats to the wellbeing of European societies. In contrast,
advocates of Euro-Islam insist that Islam can be reformed, like Christianity, to meet the
requirements of modern secularism. This paper contends that elements of all three of these vying
positions have found their way into policymaking targeting Muslims in several European lands.
The resulting inconsistency and contradiction – what I call policy “messiness” – corroborate the
process of “mutual fragilization” theorized by Charles Taylor in which actors facing radical
value pluralism develop solicitude regarding their own principles as well as greater tolerance for
ambivalence. The latter, in particular, creates what Homi Bhabha terms a “third space” from
which actors confronting cultural pluralism can freely and constructively explore crossfertilizations and hybrid combinations with the potential to yield yet unimagined approaches and
solutions to the problems of “super-diversity.” Just such creative hybridity does the paper
identify among a younger generation of European Muslims whom many observers dub “PostIslamists.”
INTRODUCTION
Intensified efforts since 9/11 to incorporate Muslims and Islam into the European secular order
have generated considerable resistance and controversy. Though church-state relations
institutionally vary from one European land to the next, they supposedly converge normatively
around a liberal understanding of secularism.1 Liberal secularism prescribes that believers
depoliticize their religious convictions in exchange for equal treatment before the law.
Depoliticization does not have to mean that religious persons and beliefs disappear from politics
altogether. After all, Christian political parties, pressure groups, politicians and activists abound
in Europe. However, liberal secularism does demand that religions and their adherents jettison
theocratic aspirations and recognize the political sovereignty and superiority of secular (that is,
man-made, ideally democratic) law and government that treat all faiths and all citizens equally.2
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This minimal requirement is what Rawls means by an “overlapping consensus” despite “the fact
of a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines -- the fact of reasonable
pluralism.”3 Habermas similarly theorizes “a consensus on the process of legitimate legislation
and exercise of power” by a “citizenry [that] can no longer be bound together by a substantive
consensus of values.”4 A small, fragmented, but nevertheless conspicuous number of Islamists in
Europe reject this requirement, though not always for the same reasons or in the same manner.5
Contending that Western secularism has shown itself to be spiritually vapid and ruinous, they
prefer to observe Islamic law in all walks of life, private and public. At the same time, an
increasingly vehement and vociferous contingent of Islamophobes avers that Islam is inherently
incompatible with liberal secular democracy and urges European governments to treat neither
Islam nor Muslims equally, but rather suspiciously as real or potential threats to the wellbeing of
European societies.6 Expressed differently, while liberalism in theory aspires to eliminate
prejudice, Islamism endorses prejudice in favor of Islam, Islamophobia prejudice against Islam.
Long considered politically taboo in post-Holocaust Europe, prejudice based on (anti-)religious
conviction is back in vogue, spawning, as a result, intensified value pluralism regarding the
proper place of religion in politics.7
Religious and ideological diversity can and does produce discord, but it can also occasion
“mutual fragilization.” This is the term Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, invents to describe
“certainly one of the main features of the world of 2000, in contrast to that of 1500.”8 The
Canadian philosopher has in mind a widespread softening of individual convictions in the face of
heightened awareness of opposing views.
We live in a condition where we cannot help but be aware that there are a number
of different construals, views which intelligent, reasonably undeluded people, of
good will, can and do disagree on. We cannot help looking over our shoulder
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from time to time, looking sideways, living our faith also in condition and
uncertainty.9
In an atmosphere of radical moral pluralism -- what Bauman has termed a “heterophilic age,”10
Beck, Giddens and Lash “reflexive modernization”11 -- humans become bombarded with
clashing normative outlooks. As Young cleverly puts it, “the deviant other is everywhere” but
“everyone is a potential deviant.”12 Although exposure to radical moral pluralism leads some to
harden their views, most “fragilize,” that is, they develop conscious or unconscious solicitude
regarding the moral stances they prefer. While fragilization can be unsettling and bewildering, it
can also create what Taylor calls a “neutral zone,”13 Homi Bhabha a “third space,”14 from which
actors confronting cultural pluralism can freely and constructively explore cross-fertilizations
and hybrid combinations with the potential to yield yet unimagined approaches and solutions to
the problems of “super-diversity.”15
This paper seeks to document mutual fragilization at the level of ideology and policy. As
regards the first, I draw attention to political actors who borrow and combine ideas from
normative worldviews that, from a purely and purist philosophical perspective, collide and
exclude one another. As regards the latter, I point to policy “messiness,” the tendency to tolerate
and enact policies whose intents and consequences run at cross purposes.16 Both types of
fragilization manifest new patterns of European secularism -- actually secularisms – in which the
prospect of and perhaps even the need for an “overlapping consensus” are abating.
One preliminary caveat is in order. I do not for a moment want to imply that normative
pluralism alone shapes policymaking. Analysts have identified a range of non-normative factors
that influence immigration policy. These include demographics,17 health of the economy,18
political opportunity structures,19 international crises,20 media salience,21 level of government,22
courts,23 institutional and legal heritage,24 political access25, asymmetry of available resources,26
3

ethnic origin,27 type of political actor such as (opportunistic, ideological) elected officials versus
(pragmatic, problem-solving) administrators,28 and administrative rationality or
“governmentality.”29 That noted, several studies document the considerable influence of
normative arguments and expectations on immigration policy making.30 These and other studies
of normative frames and schemas have tended to exaggerate the degree and extent of normative
consensus in any given land, making the French out to be, for instance, uniformly republicans,
the Germans ethno-nationalists, the British and Dutch multiculturalists.31 By contrast, the
concept of fragilization enables us to unpack the normative dimension in such a way as to reveal
its polyvalent, dynamic, that is, messy character.
EURO-ISLAM
Most European governments have since 9/11 adopted a two-pronged approach to homeland
security: 1) increase police efforts and powers to detect, thwart, arrest and convict terrorists and
their enablers; and 2) more vigorously encourage the integration of Muslims into society so as to
lessen their sense of alienation and presumed susceptibility to political extremism. The latter has
entailed the pledge to combat the rampant Islamophobic discrimination that countless studies
have documented in most European lands.32 Prodded by the European Union’s Race Directive of
2000, whose Article Seven denounces discrimination based on religion, member states have
established anti-discrimination agencies such as the Commission for Equality and Human Rights
in the United Kingdom (2004), the Haute Authorité de Lutte contre la Discriminations et pour
l’Egalité in France (2005; since 2011 Défenseur des Droits) and Die Antidiskriminierungsstelle
des Bundes in Germany (2006). Going a step farther, most European governments have sought to
counterbalance inherited institutional favoritism by establishing formal, high-profile relations
with Islam that aim to parallel and (eventually) emulate those already in place between the state
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and Christianity (and often Judaism). While some states, such as Austria, Belgium, Sweden and
the Netherlands, already had close ties with Islamic representatives long before 9/11, others
deliberately moved to form them thereafter. Thus did France found the Conseil Français du Culte
Musulman in 2003, Britain the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board in 2005, and
Germany the Deutsche Islam Konferenz in 2006. The following official mission statement of the
Italian Consulta Islamica, set up in 2005, is typical. It is to be
a consultative body of the Interior Ministry that conducts research which
formulates positions and proposals for the purpose of encouraging institutional
dialogue with the Islamic communities in order to identify the most adequate
solutions for a harmonious inclusion of Islam within the national community with
respect to the laws of the Italian Republic.33
These and other efforts to embrace Muslims have been endorsed at the highest levels of
government. As early as 1993, French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua posited: “It is no longer
enough to talk of Islam in France. There has to be a French Islam. The French Republic is ready
for this.”34 In 2009 in an editorial in Le Monde (9 December), French President Nicolas Sarkozy
voiced his desire to “put the Muslim religion on an equal footing with all other great religions.”
German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has also maintained that his society and
government must endeavor to transform the “Muslims in Germany” into “German Muslims.”35
Tony Blair first visited a mosque at the outset of Ramadan in 1999, Her Majesty ordered a prayer
room built at Windsor Castle for her lone Muslim servant in 2004, and Prince Charles has voiced
his wish to be crowned “Defender of Faiths” rather than “Defender of the Faith.”
The desired end of such out-reach is “Euro-Islam,” a neologism as telling as it is popular.
It is telling because Euro-Islam is not only conceived as an Islam befitting life in Europe, but
also as a Europeanized Islam, that is, an Islam that has been subjected to similar self-scrutiny and
self-reform as the Christian denominations are alleged to have undergone in the modern age
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(even if with formidable resistance at times, such as within Roman Catholicism prior to Vatican
II).36 As envisaged by its proponents, reformists such as Naser Khader (Denmark), Baroness
Kishwer Falkner (UK), Malek Cheleb (France) and Bassam Tibi (Germany), Euro-Islam would
relinquish its theocratic ambitions and embrace democracy. It would tolerate all other faiths,
including atheism, and recognize the right of each individual to choose or craft his or her own
creed. Freedom of religion further means that the prohibition of apostasy would have to be
excised from Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, Euro-Islam would purge from conventional Islam
all precepts and rituals which offend modern democratic sensibilities, such as the subordination
of women to men or eye-for-eye justice. Likewise, this “enlightened Islam [which] is compatible
with world civilization, with Europe, and with the spirit of the Republic”37 would systematically
disavow Quranic interpretations of nature belied by modern science. Most importantly, it would
entail subjecting the Quran to the same kind of rational scrutiny applied in biblical criticism
since the nineteenth century. The sacred text would be read not as the inerrant and literal word of
God but as the words of specific men formulated in specific times – indeed times very different
from our own. French reformer Bassam Tahhan writes: “The tradition regards the Koran as onedimensional and fixed. This approach is not rationalist. To be a rationalist is to accept that each
era, with its [particular] methods and discoveries, presents its own reading of the Koran, and this
is the way it will be until the end of days.”38 Once Muslims are made to understand that there
exists no real alternative to interpreting the Quran, they will become more comfortable
customizing the creed to better jibe with modern rationalism, including democracy and
pluralism. An Islam based on independent judgment (ijtihad) rather than on slavish obedience to
authority is not only compatible with the Quran but likelier to survive and thrive in a culture such
as Europe’s that celebrates free choice.39 Euro-Islam represents, then, a largely depoliticized
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Islam which seeks to reinforce and accommodate rather than question or disrupt the perceived
European secular order. The acknowledged Habermasian and Euro-Muslim Bassam Tibi
summarizes:
By acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism, Euro-Islam would give up the
claim of Islamic dominance. Thus defined, Euro-Islam would be compatible with
liberal democracy, individual human rights, and the requirements of a civil
society. It would also contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result
in ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow complete
assimilation of Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption of forms of civil society
leading to an enlightened, open-minded Islamic identity compatible with
European civic culture.40
Mainstream European politicians officially pronounce that they will have no truck with
any Islam except Euro-Islam. Indeed, they often opportunistically exploit relations with Islam to
spotlight their unequivocally democratic credentials. For instance, a then still Interior Minister
Nicolas Sarkozy said of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman in 2003: “It is precisely
because we recognize the right of Islam to sit at the table of the republic that we will not accept
any deviation. Any prayer leader whose views run contrary to the values of the republic will be
expelled.”41 Tony Blair, while averring that the only sure strategy for defeating Islamist
extremism had to embrace Islam, nonetheless emphatically added: “There has to be a shared
acceptance that some things we believe in and we do together: obedience to certain values like
democracy, rule of law, equality between men and women...This common space cannot be left to
chance or individual decsion. It has to be accepted as mandatory.”42 And in a unmistakable
allusion to Muslims, Angela Merkel insisted that “anyone coming here must respect our
constitution and tolerate our Western and Christian roots.”43 Indeed, at one meeting of the
German Islam Conference, the Muslim participants were asked to strike from their Qurans verses
at odds with gender equality as a show of sincere commitment to democracy.44
ISLAMOPHOBIA
7

Such hardline stances manifest fragilization toward Islamophobic prejudice. They hold Islam in
greater suspicion and therefore to a higher standard than Christianity or Judaism. It is hard to
imagine, for instance, a European politician (save perhaps a Communist) seeking to score
popularity points by demanding that Christian clerics strike passages from their Holy Scripture.
Invitees to such state-sponsored “dialogues” often include, in addition to imams, Muslim
apostates and even atheists who have in one way or another made a name for themselves telling
of the oppression they suffered as “Muslims,” that is as “insider experts” of a sort.45 As some
indignant Muslim clerics who took part in the first German Islam Conference in 2006
sardonically complained regarding the invitees, the rough counterpart would be inviting “the
Pope and pop star Madonna” to a purportedly serious meeting regarding relations between the
state and the Roman Catholic Church.46 Indeed, it has been practicing as opposed to lapsed
Muslims who have frequently been expelled from such commissions (typically on suspicion of
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood).47 The (Bernard) Stasi Commission convened by Jacques Chirac
in 2003, which recommended the ban on veils in French schools that passed into law in 2004,
excluded testimony from veiled women on grounds that their views could not be trusted as their
own.48 Bans of various kinds on Islamic dress (not to mention mosques and minarets) exist or are
being considered in many other European lands.49 Equally prejudiced against or suspicious of
Islam in particular are the numerous integration and civics courses and loyalty pledges that for
all intents and purposes only Muslims are required to take in order to obtain citizenship or a visa.
The Dutch course introduced in 1998, which has served as something of a model for the various
types of loyalty tests that have subsequently sprung up in many European lands, subjects
“students” to footage of gay men kissing and topless women sunbathing to teach and test the
appropriate response, which, needless to say, is toleration rather than indignation.50 Nor should
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we overlook the fact that racial and ethnic profiling of Muslims by police has proliferated across
Europe as have deport-first-prove-later measures for dealing with suspected criminals of Muslim
heritage.51 Sadly, the preoccupation with Muslims may have contributed to the free reign
exploited by “Christian” terrorists such as Norway’s Anders Behring Breivik or Germany’s
National Socialist Underground Zwickau Cell.
The extra scrutiny is necessary, claim Islamophobes, because Islam is inherently
antidemocratic and expansionist. European Islamophobia tends to manifest itself in two often
overlapping, but nonetheless distinguishable strands. Mostly from the progressive Left stem
concerns that the large presence of Muslims imperils the slow but steady progress of Reason and
Democracy in Europe since the Enlightenment against the benighted forces of obscurantism and
tyranny. The Quran preaches theocracy – “the dictatorship of the mullahs”52 – and commands of
its followers “submission” to divine law (Sharia) rather than self-determination through
democracy. Particularly threatened are the most recent achievements of the ongoing
Enlightenment project such as equal rights for women and for homosexuals. The former Islam
treats as virtual slaves whose place in heaven can be secured only through obsequious obedience
to men; the latter as base sinners whose destiny is eternal damnation. Typical of this common
essentializing trope is Thierry Chervel’s lament, versions of which could be quoted from any
number of a chorus of prominent Islam-naysayers such as André Glucksmann, Emmanuell Todd,
Fadela Amara, Herman Philipse, Alice Schwarzer, Necla Kelek, Ralph Giordano, and Farrukh
Dhondy:
In the confrontation with Islamism, the Left has abandoned its principles. In the
past it stood for cutting the ties to convention and tradition, but in the case of
Islam it reinstates them in the name of multiculturalism. It is proud to have fought
for women's rights, but in Islam it tolerates head scarves, arranged marriages, and
wife-beating. It once stood for equal rights, now it preaches a right to difference –
and thus different rights. It proclaims freedom of speech, but when it comes to
9

Islam it coughs in embarrassment. It once supported gay rights, but now keeps
silent about Islam's taboo on homosexuality. The West's long-due process of selfrelativisation at the end of the colonial era, which was promoted by postmodernist
and structuralist ideas, has led to cultural relativism and the loss of standards.53
So convinced of Islam’s inherent inclination toward dictatorship is prominent French intellectual
Bernhard Henri Lévy that he refuses to refer to Islamists with anything but the neologism
“fascislamist.” Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer prefers “the new
totalitarianism.”54 It seems an obvious conclusion that “one cannot consider Islam a religion
among others, a religion that might have a right to exist under the big roof of European
tolerance.”55
From the right side of the political spectrum one more often encounters grave concern
regarding the purported adulteration of Europe’s “Judeo-Christian character.” Large-scale
postwar immigration combined with higher birth rates among Muslims is said to have
occasioned the “Islamization” of Europe to a point where natives feel “strangers in their own
country.”56 While soberer observers raise doubts about dilution of the ethnic and linguistic
homogeneity or “social glue” that any society supposedly requires to function well,57 other more
alarmist and vociferous Cassandras discern an Islamic conspiracy to transform Europe into
“Eurabia” using Muslim migrants as the foot soldiers. Thus wrote Italian journalist Oriana
Fallaci in her second bestselling diatribe against Islam, The Force of Reason: “Europe becomes
more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam. In each of our cities lies a second city: a
Muslim city, a city run by the Koran. A stage in the Islamic expansionism.”58 Indeed purporting
to expose such a plot has become one of the surest ways since 9/11 to catapult oneself onto the
bestseller list.59 Like Fallaci’s, the paranoid arguments typically contend that Islam harbors a
built-in urge toward militant expansionism which stems back to its very founder, Muhammad,
who established an Islamic theocracy in Mecca with the sword. Following the prophet’s lead,
10

subsequent Islamic Empires have all deployed military might to spread the faith, including into
Europe during the Middle Ages. Islamists and Jihadists will not stop until they have conquered
Europe as their stepping stone to subduing the entire West. Tolerating their presence represents
Europe’s 21st-century counterpart to Munich of 1938.60
Both left and right Islamophobia draw from and reinforce (neo)Orientalist discourse.
Said, of course, penned the classic study of Orientalism as a discourse that not only stigmatized
the Orient but also legitimized its domination by Western powers. The discourse, created and
conveyed by an interlocking network of artists, experts, administrators, journalists and
politicians, represents Islam as a monolithic and static religion, culture, indeed, entire civilization
that resists not only change but, in particular, rational persuasion. The discourse is furthermore
reductionist and essentialist in that it portrays all Muslims as fully determined by an allencompassing Islamic ethos. The discourse thereby denies Muslims the free agency and reason
to adapt, alter or reject their faith. This supposition, moreover, conveniently dismisses Muslims’
self-representation as the nonsensical utterances of persons intellectually imprisoned by a
benighted creed and culture. In the Orientalist discourse, Muslims are represented rather than
heard, suspected rather than trusted and governed rather than empowered. Finally, by creating
the proverbial Negative Other, the discourse self-servingly projects a positive counter-image of
the West and Westerners as utterly other and therefore superior to unenlightened Orientals. “The
Orient,” writes Said, “has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea,
personality, experience…European culture gained its strength and identity by setting itself off
against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.”61
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There now exists a plethora of studies documenting both the prevalence and sway of this
type of neo-Orientalist discourse in European politics and media.62 Gest’s assessment is
representative:
Interpretations of Islam that portray it as irreducible, impenetrable,
undifferentiated and immune to processes of change have long obscured the
complexities of the historical experience of Muslims across different societies.
Today, these perceptions persist, overlooking the complicated process of
acculturation and mutual adaptation by Muslims and institutions of Western
Europe. They ignore Islam’s plasticity and diversity, and instead allow
exaggerated misimages – stemming from exotica or invented in a narrow
historical context and augmented by selective episodic details – to constitute
Muslim history and tradition. And by considering Islam as an undifferentiated
whole, essentialist discourse is able to broad-brush Muslims as a threat to the
equally undifferentiated “good” societies of the West.63
The power of Islamophobia lies in transforming prejudice into prudence. The “Muslims” that
vast numbers of non-Muslim Europeans “know” are for the most part virtual or fully
“mediatized;”64 and these fictionalized Muslims are indeed sinister and threatening, for their
imputed Islamic piety makes them immutably anti-democratic, regressive, misogynistic,
militaristic, and, most worrisomely, irrational. Small wonder, then, that the 2011 Pew Global
Attitudes Survey found that 36% of those polled in Britain and France, 55% in Germany, and
63% in Spain have an “unfavorable” attitude toward Muslims in general.65 European Muslims
have become the victim (before but even more so after 9/11) of what Stanley Cohen has
diagnosed as “moral panic.” Moral panic obtains when opportunistic political agents manage to
stigmatize a targeted group in such a way that the group’s purported moral deviance becomes
convincingly portrayed as an existential threat to the society as a whole.66 Furthermore, moral
panic is all the likelier in the “risk society” of late modernity where persons become preoccupied
more with potential than with actual dangers.67
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Moral panic feeds off exaggeration as much as distortion. Needless to say, neither
European secularism nor Christianity lies imperiled, at least not from Muslims. Theocratic
parties and politicians remain rare and largely unelectable. The schools, both private and public,
overwhelmingly teach and socialize pupils to the core secularist tenet that democratic law is
supreme. Indeed, studies reveal that the vast majority of European Muslims are assimilating to
secular lifestyles that fore the most part relegate religious belief and practice to the private
sphere.68 At the same time, European lands remain fully saturated in Christian lore, ritual, and
symbolism, from hourly ringing church bells to crucifixes in classrooms to religious oriented
holidays, all of which Muslims must suffer. The (Gregorian) calendar itself is of Christian origin!
Laborde labels such favoritism “soft rules,” mostly unorchestrated, unofficial yet pervasive
favoring of Christian norms, expectations and presuppositions as “normal” and Muslim ones as
“abnormal.”69 And yet, much Christian favoritism is officially and deliberately state-sponsored.
Take the case of private but nonetheless state-subsidized religious schools. Germany has
thousands of Christian schools compared to two Islamic schools; the Netherlands 5000 compared
to 50; Britain 7000 compared to seven (despite the fact that more Muslims, in absolute not
proportional terms, weekly attend mosque than Anglicans weekly attend church).70 Even in
laïque France, roughly a fifth of French pupils attend religious (mostly Christian) schools 85
percent of whose costs are covered by the state.71 By contrast, only a few dozen Muslim pupils
attend a handful of Muslim schools.72 As Davie incisively observes, “in European society, the
religious playing field is not level, nor is it likely to become so in the foreseeable future.”73 Not a
single European land currently comes close to fulfilling Bauböck’s elegant vision of genuine
secular neutrality and fairness:
the state can live up to its obligation of equal concern and respect for all citizens
by, on the one hand, extending whatever historical privileges the dominant
13

religion has enjoyed to the minority congregations and, on the other hand,
abolishing those that involuntarily subject non-believers to some religious
authority.74
ISLAMISM & EUROPOBIA
Both secular and Christian favoritism enrage and terrify Islamists. For them the issue is not
simply maintaining a particular identity; it is about defending their access to eternal salvation.
They resolutely believe that Christian (and Jewish) denominations have made a tragic, even
suicidal mistake with grave consequences for all humanity in submitting to the conditions of
Western secularism. By subordinating themselves to man-made law, they have forfeited the role
of moral leadership, thereby opened the way for unbuttoned hedonism to become the ersatz
religion for the masses, and left morally unguided and unchecked an economic and political elite
that has ravaged the globe and its peoples through wanton pursuit of this-worldly profit and
power. Secularism, for Islamists, is synonymous with the triumph of sin over morality, evil over
good. They resolve to resist it, which they believe they do best by endeavoring to live by Islamic
precepts as much as possible in all aspects of their life. One Copenhagen imam, for example,
averred in 2004 that “secularism is a disgusting form of oppression…No Muslim can accept
secularism, freedom, and democracy. It is for Allah alone to legislate how our society shall be
regulated. Muslims wish and long for Allah’s law to replace the law of man.”75 A zealous
cybernaut at oumma.com, likewise, announces: “Laws made by men are made for them and
therefore are always unjust, only Quranic law is good because it is impartial.”76 Such words echo
Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, a widely read and praised book among Islamists in which the
venerated martyr denounces all man-made laws as the product of ignorance (jahilyya) and calls
on his brethren to defy, depose and replace them with Islamic law wherever possible.77 The
organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, claims that “Islam is a complete way of life that
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provides guidance for man in all aspects of life. It is not defined in contradistinction to other
ideologies or religions, but by being the truth revealed by the creator of man, life and the
universe.”78 This is what I mean by the term “Islamism,” which I use broadly to envelop the
beliefs of all those who strive toward a society in which Islamic precepts and laws -- typically
understood as those enunciated in the Quran and Sunnah – predominate. Due to limited space, I
gloss over the significant differences in strategy for achieving the Islamist goal -- differences
ranging from pietist personal conversion stressed by such groups as Tablighi Jamaat and
Jamaatunnur, to non-violent political action practiced by the Muslim Brotherhood and its
European affiliate the Union of Islamic Organizations in Europe, to violent jihadi militant
organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Supporters of Shariah and Groupe Islamique Armé.79
Islamists tend to engage in inverted othering. The concept parallels what others identify
as a “duplication” or “mirror” effect whereby radicalized Muslims recast the stigma of
themselves as Europe’s negative Other to produce an equally reductionist counter-stereotype in
which the West and Westerners appear evil and Islam and “true” Muslims good.80 Inverted
othering too reveals fragilization. Islamist activists shrewdly borrow from postcolonial and
postmodern studies influential readings of the West in late modernity and customize them to
undergird their Islamist agenda. The conventional image of Islamists as proverbial ostriches with
their heads sunk deep in the sand of a medieval worldview misses the mark. I concur with Roy,
who contends that Islamist activists are best understood as fully integrated into a single global
political discourse whose successful ideas and tactics they keenly study and dexterously
employ.81
Islamists, for instance, deftly exploit the postmodern argument that Muslims are Europe’s
latest Other, the newest group Europeans love to hate. As intimated above, this postmodern
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argument that interprets Muslims as something like the new Jews, whose stigmatized popular
image reinforces European superciliousness, has become a staple of European migration studies,
particularly on the Left.82 Like postmodernists, Islamists contend that the stigmatization of
Muslims is not merely hypocritical, a double standard, but rather constitutive of European
identity itself. Postmodernists, of course, offer up a wide variety of reasons, ranging from
sublimated impulses and needs à la Freud to simple force of habit, for why Westerners engage in
negative othering. Islamists, by contrast, contend that Westerners stigmatize Muslims because
they have nothing to be proud of in their own civilization, having completely befouled it through
rampant turpitude. Rotterdam-based imam, Khalil el-Moumni, for example, declares that
“Western civilization is a civilization without morals,” while the Islamic Party of Britain
contends that “there is nothing in Western societies that remotely resembles good behaviour.”83
According to the Muslim Parliament UK, Europe is “beginning to develop disorders of the mind,
body and soul as a direct consequence of unmitigated secularism.”84 Thankfully, claims Kalim
Siddiqui, Islam “possesses moral precepts such as collective responsibility and moderation that
liberate man from western-like materialism, egoism and money-grabbing corruption and
overriding selfish individualism of the West.”85 Westerners do not want to face this disturbing
fact. The Swedish journal Salaam charges: “The ones who are behind this negative propaganda
hate the message that Islam has brought, i.e. that all men are equal before Allah and that the best
of us is the most devout.” They aim to “make Islam look like a weird, horrible and strange faith
so that no one ever should come to think of taking an interest in or convert to that faith.”86
A second trope commonly employed by Islamists contends that Europe and Europeans
have long been and remain bent on subjugating Muslims. With arguments unmistakably
reminiscent of postcolonial luminaries from Fanon to Said, Islamists contend that the West has
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long harbored and often realized (neo)imperialist designs on the Orient. From the Crusades
through the colonialism of the “White Man’s Burden” to the current “War on Terror,” this urge
to dominate Muslims has figured prominent in the Western psyche. Needless to say, the USA
and Israel lead the “Crusaders and Zionists” of today, but Europe vitriolic recrimination for
supporting this ongoing injustice and subjugation.87 For example, in his “martyrdom video,” 7/7
suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan justified his actions with the following insinuation:
“Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people
all over the world.”88
Within Europe, Europeans perpetuate the imperialist tradition and mindset through a
combined demonization and domination of Muslims that marginalize and exploit them as
second-class citizens. Britain’s Islamchannel, for instance, advertises itself as the “Voice of the
Voiceless, Voice of the Oppressed.” Siddiqui charges that “post-Christian secular society,”
including “the British Government,” seeks “to destroy our values,” while Abdul Wahid,
Chairman of the British Hizb ut-Tahrir, claims “the government’s long-term objective is to
manufacture a compliant, subdued, secular Muslim community in Britain.”89 Such remarks are
unmistakably informed by the postcolonial interpretation of immigration in Europe that discerns
an ongoing attitude of “coloniality,” that is, “a logic of governmentality that not only supports
specific forms of historical colonialism but continues to structure a planetary hierarchy in terms
of a distinction between West and the non-West…beyond the formal institutionalization of
colonialism.”90
By stressing Islamists’ fragilization toward postmodern and postcolonial analysis, I do
not mean to dismiss their capacity for independent thought. I aim rather to proffer an
interpretation of so-called “multiculturalism” that reads it as an outgrowth of mutual fragilization
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as opposed to creeping Islamization. Policies of official or “de facto multiculturalism”91 have
doubtless opened up spaces across Europe where Islamists preach and practice their anti-Western
and anti-secular worldview. Scores of studies document the existence of transnational enclaves
in which migrants live by norms and values significantly different from the majority
population.92 These are not exclusively Islamist enclaves, but Islamists do figure prominently in
many of them where they carve out what some have called “protection zones”93 or domains of
“Islamic ambiance.”94
However, two caveats need to be interjected immediately. First, such Islamist zones of de
facto autonomy represent tiny islands in a surrounding sea of both irreligious and Christian
favoritism of the kinds discussed above. Second, and more importantly, Islamist “apartism”95
does not reflect anything remotely resembling the Islamization of the policy-making process
itself. European governments continue to be staffed by precious few elected or appointed
Muslims with influence to shape policy and even fewer seeking to legitimize multicultural
measures with reference to theocratic passages in the Quran or Hadith. Rather, through
fragilizing exposure to widely circulated postmodern and postcolonial ideas, many officials have
come to doubt the morality or the feasibility of insisting that Muslims assimilate to European
secular norms and values. I am not suggesting that postmodernists and postcolonialists have
usurped positions of power, though this presumably has occurred in some places. Far likelier is
that officials who themselves generally prefer what we are calling liberal secular values consider
plausible the postmodern nihilist notion that those same values are historically and culturally
contingent rather than universal and, particularly in relation to Muslims, imposed rather than
desired.96 Resulting solicitude generates sympathy, conscious or unconscious, for the core
multicultural tenet that migrants should not have to relinquish their particular culture as a
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condition of migrating to European lands. In my reading, then, multiculturalism does indeed
represent a certain softening toward Islamism, but not toward those elements that stem directly
from Islamic doctrine per se, but rather toward those elements which Islamists, being insightful
observers of current political discourse, have shrewdly if not disingenuously adopted from
postmodern discourse precisely because they do cast doubt on liberal secular assimilationism.
We can broadly distinguish between two types of multiculturalist policies: direct and
indirect support of Islamist organizations. Since the 1970s, European governments at various
levels have regularly funded a variety of immigrant organizations dedicated to nurturing and
preserving immigrants’ language and culture in the receiving country. Thus have public monies
flowed to countless Islamic organizations to erect mosques, establish community centers, found
female support groups, fund private or public Islamic education, provide imams to undertake
pastoral work with prisoners or patients, operate public access radio or TV stations, or open
sports clubs.97 Typically such multiculturalist funding has been provided with minimal strings
attached. Often officials identify a small number of prominent community leaders to decide how
to distribute and spend public funds. These “elders” of sorts may pay lip service to liberal
democratic values but in reality are left to run their organizations with virtually no governmental
oversight.98 It is important to note that such support for multicultural measures has persisted and
expanded over the past three decades not merely in countries with an official multicultural policy
such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium or Britain, but in practically every European land.
Sometimes, multicultural policies were rationalized to the public under the rubric of
“reintegration,” that is, preparing the migrants to return to their homelands when, in fact,
officials knew few planned to so.99 More often, officials tasked with dealing with immigrants
implemented multicultural measures underneath the political and media radar.100 The
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Multiculuralism Policy Index at Queens University finds that despite much recent political
rhetoric denouncing multiculturalism as “failed,” multiculturalist policies in fact increased not
only from 1980 to 2000, but also from 2000 to 2010 across Europe and “more than offset” the
high-profile rescinding of such policies in places like the Netherlands since 9/11.101 Moreover,
much research shows that Islamists, employing their legendary social organizing skills, have
proven adept at penetrating immigrant organizations and steering them to support an Islamist
agenda. They spew Europhobic rhetoric, discourage or forbid their members to interact with
“Europeans,” preach the superiority of Islamic to secular law, and instruct adherents to follow
the former even if it means transgressing the latter. There is, of course, much Islamophobic fearmongering and sensationalism in reporting that exposes such organizations, but it would
nevertheless be naïve to think that state funding is not reaching Islamists.102
Second, indirect support for Islamism in Europe occurs through toleration of Islamist
organizations and mosques which have no relationship with government. All European
constitutions guarantee religious freedom. As a result, Islamist organizations find much more
congenial grounds for organizing than they do in most sending countries whose governments
often repress them (especially before the Arab Spring) – a reason why so many Islamist exiles
from Ruhollah Khomeini to Necmettin Erbakan to Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni took or take safe
haven in Europe and organize their efforts from there. They are by and large left free to organize
as they wish and to raise money from all manner of sources such as the Muslim World League
bankrolled by Saudi Arabia.103 As mentioned in the introduction, modern European secularism
implicitly demands that religious organizations eschew theocracy as a condition for exercising
religious freedom. However, many Islamist groups quite openly espouse theocracy.104 To be
sure, many of their strivings are directed toward establishing Islamic regimes in the sending
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countries. However, their efforts can and do apply to European soil. Naturally, there are lunatic
voices like Omar Bakri, who prophesizes imminent victory in Europe when “the black flag of
Islam flies over Downing Street.”105 But the lion’s share of Islamist organizations works less
flamboyantly but nevertheless assiduously to increase step by step and person by person the
number of believers who value Islamic over secular law. They aspire, often successfully, to carve
out “zones of exclusion.”106 Within these areas of “self-imposed apartheid” ranging in size from
the four walls of a flat or mosque to entire neighborhoods, “Islamic” law prevails, including
when it transgresses secular law (for instance, polygamy or coerced confinement). Here those
who violate Sharia rather than state law are the ones punished or harassed.107
Islamist organizations tend to spurn cooperation with Western governments. Indeed, they
warn their adherents against “Westoxification” (Gharbzadegi), Iranian Jalal al-e Ahmad’s widely
influential notion that any contact with Westerners is Kufr (impious) and as such can initiate a
contagion that leads the pious Muslim into sin and, worse, into apostasy. Islamist organizations
often thwart the efforts of European governments to reach out to Muslims. In Germany, Spain,
Britain, and France, Islamist associations have refused or withdrawn support for the high-profile
national councils alluded to above.108 Within European Muslim communities, where Islamist
organizations are often well organized and well respected, such disapprobation tends to
undermine the legitimacy of governmental efforts. Programs sponsored by European
governments are viewed with suspicion as potentially repressive and more often than not simply
avoided or ignored. The proportion of Islamic organizations that eschew contact with European
governments is estimated at between one-fourth and one-third.109 As Roy perspicaciously
observes, so long as “Muslim identity is tinged with a strongly anti-imperialist hue,” enthusiastic
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support from a European government can often “amount to giving them [the sponsored Muslim
organizations] the kiss of death.”110
I do not highlight Islamism with the intention of fueling the flames of Islamophobic
hysteria. I aim instead to underscore the complex, polyvalent nature of European secularism. In
theory, European secular states are supposed to be neutral toward religion. In reality, despite
important institutional differences,111 they all at once preach the supremacy of secular law that
treats all believers and non-believers equally, oversee extensive Christian (and sometimes
Jewish) favoritism, endeavor to combat discrimination against Muslims, reach out to EuroMuslims, and support or tolerate Islamists who thwart efforts to strengthen Euro-Islam. In this
vein, it is interesting to note Bader’s observation in his major study of European secularism:
States are not monolithic. Aims and strategies vary, and the legislative, judicial
and executive branches often follow contradictory policies. The differentiation
only increases when comparing federal, state and local levels. Every state thus
shows a variety of partly inconsistent institutional arrangements; and actual
policies diverge from legal norms.112
In reality, most European governments do not practice secularism, rather secularisms – a
complex, dynamic intermingling and over-layering of policies whose intent and consequences
often run deeply at odds with one another.113 Such policy messiness reflects widening mutual
fragilization whereby policymakers and citizens alike become increasingly accustomed to, if not
necessarily comfortable with, the co-existence of rival outlooks and approaches to religion in
contemporary life and society. As mutual fragilization expands both the prospect of and perhaps
need for an “overlapping consensus,” let alone coherent policy, dwindle.
POST-ISLAMISM
Make no mistake. Mutual fragilization can prompt mutual demonization but it need not, as the
example of post-Islamism attests. As conscious or unconscious apprehension regarding the
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persuasiveness of one’s preferred outlooks intensifies, the temptation to demonize one’s
perceived adversaries can strengthen. If the arguments for one’s position seem less able to
persuade adversaries on the basis of merit alone, then assailing one’s opponents can present itself
as an increasingly tempting strategy. Demonization can prove highly alluring, for it distracts
attention away from one’s own vulnerabilities, exaggerates the foes’ shortcomings, and often
garners considerable attention. As political actors follow the lead of media producers who know
that bad news sells better than good news, the politics of immigration in Europe has increasingly
degenerated into a politics of slighting, fear-mongering and scapegoating.114 Indeed, the hate
promoters tend not only to prey but also depend on one another. Thus Islamophobes’ outlandish
distortions of Islam and Muslims become the Europhobes’ evidence that the entire West is evil
and sadistic, and vice versa. The opposing camps become locked in a self-referencing and selfreinforcing war of manipulated words and images that becomes virtually hermetically sealed off
from other more nuanced discussion and analysis.115
Rather than flee fragilization into essentialist and binary stereotypes, post-Islamists
embrace the ambivalence of fragilization as an opportunity to discover new insights. The latter
unpredictably emerge through the hybrid combination of worldviews presumed to be mutually
exclusive: liberalism and Islamism. I apply the less-than-perfect label “post-Islamists”116 to refer
to a new generation of Muslim intellectuals and activists in search of a “more sophisticated
idiom of Islam.”117 While their critique of many aspects of modern Western societies is
unmistakably informed by the thought of earlier Islamists such as Qutb or Abul Ala Maududi,
these “moderate Muslims”118 eschew the wholesale rejection of Western society associated with
both the Islamist pioneers as well as their contemporary orthodox adherents. “I don't deny my
Muslim roots,” claims Tariq Ramadan, “but I don't vilify Europe either."119 The proponents of
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this “critical Islam”120 tend to reside in Europe, to stem from the middle class, and to be highly
and mostly Western educated.121 They tend to adopt and become comfortable with many of the
styles and rhythms of modern Western life regarding, for instance, education, professionalism,
consumerism and individualism.122 That said, they operate in a fully “transnational religious
discourse”123 that is profoundly in touch with and deeply colored by prominent reformist thinkers
in the Middle East such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Rachid al-Ghannouchi
and Yusuf al-Qaradawi. These mavericks in Europe are contesting for leadership, often with
success, with an older more strictly anti-Western guard in Islamist associations such as the Union
of Islamic Organisations in Europe (OIOE), Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG) or the
UK Islamic Mission. They publish their ideas in journals and magazines such as Q-News, The
Muslim News, La Medina and Die Islamische Zeitung or on websites such as Islam21.net,
oumma.com and huda.de. 124
In contrast to Euro-Muslims, post-Islamists resist a wholesale endorsement of the modern
West. To be sure, post-Islamists recognize and value certain aspects of Western society. Chief
among these are democratic rights and liberties, particularly religious freedom. Thus does
Ramadan remind readers that it is precisely the separation of church and state that can “protect
the total independence of Muslims in France.”125 The erstwhile leader of IGMG, Mehmet
Erbakan, contends that European Muslims live in far superior conditions for freely exercising
their religion than ninety percent of their Muslim brethren in the so-called “Islamic world,”
where authoritarian regimes have traditionally quashed religious freedom. Such authoritarian
rule, even when done in the name of Islamic law, he maintains “is not a fulfillment of God’s will
rather its perversion.”126 Tunisian exile (until 2011) al-Ghannouchi famously changed Europe’s
designation from the conventional dar-al-harb (space hostile to Muslims) to dar-al-Islam (space
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congenial to Islam).127 Ramadan endorsed the Tunisian’s re-categorization but augmented it to
dar al-shahada (space of testimony).128 The Swiss activist and grandson of Muslim Brotherhood
Founder Hassan al-Banna implores European Muslims to take advantage of the great
opportunities and rights available there -- to abandon their “Pakistani, Turkish or Arab”
“ghettos” (both “social and intellectual”) and “integrate themselves into European culture”129 –
and thereby craft a “more self-critical” Islam130 as well as a model of “Islamic citizenship” that
will stand as an example (testimony) to the rest of the Islamic world to emulate in the 21st
century.131
Post-Islamists simply do not discern the incompatibility between Islam and “Western”
values postulated by Islamophobes and Islamists alike. The Union of Islamic Organizations of
France (UOIF), the IGMG and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), despite their Islamist
links, each publicly proclaims its fidelity to the constitution of France, Germany and Britain
respectively.132 MCB, for example, officially “encourag[es] individual Muslims and Muslim
organisations to play a full and participatory role in public life.”133 Granted, European
constitutions permit some things, such as usury and alcohol consumption, that Islam forbids.
However, the critical point is that none of the constitutions obliges Muslims to engage in such
activities.134 Hassan Safoui, the media manager of UOIF, sees, for instance, no reason why
persons of different “beliefs or references” cannot “agree on shared values” that build a “mutual
ethics between Islam and the West to fight social diseases in the European communities.”135
As intimated in the previous quotation, post-Islamists discern grave shortcomings in
European societies. Moreover, they believe themselves to be particularly well situated both to
recognize and remedy such profound problems. This more critical predisposition distinguishes
them from Euro-Muslims, who, generally speaking, interpret the achievements of Western
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society since the European Enlightenment as progressive and exemplary. In the eyes of postIslamists, Muslims, as victims of European imperialism, are well suited to expose the darker side
of European “greatness.” They possess firsthand experience with the injustice and inequality that
go hand in hand with European prosperity and power not only in the Third World, whence most
European Muslims hail, but also in Europe itself, where they are exploited and discriminated
against.136 Muslims can also help to correct the lopsided interpretation proffered by
Eurocentrism, which views Western Civilization as the lone font of the world’s greatest and
lasting achievements. Ramadan chastises this supercilious combination of ignorance and
arrogance with which Eurocentric secularists dismiss all but their own ideas:
Convinced that they are progressive, they give themselves the arbitrary right to
proclaim the definitively reactionary nature of religions…In the end, only a
handful of “Muslims-who-think-like-us” are accepted, while the others are denied
the possibility of being genuinely progressive fighters armed with their own set of
values. By doing this, the dialogue with Islam is transformed into an interactive
monologue which massages “our ideological certainties” just as Huntington
wanted to ensure “our strategic interests.”137
Proud, educated, outspoken Muslims can shed light on not only the great accomplishments of
Islamic civilization, but the latters’ profound contribution to so-called “Western civilization”
itself.138 A genuinely open dialogue that includes Muslims and Islam as part of Europe past and
present -- that undermines rather than perpetuates binary stereotypes -- can lead to a fuller if
admittedly less self-congratulatory comprehension of Europeanness.139
Post-Islamists want, however, more than merely to be considered insiders rather than
outsiders to Europe. They want to improve Europe; and they want to do so qua Muslims. They
refuse to relegate their religion to the private sphere (like, say, a hobby) as the cost of fully
participating in public life. Thus did the founding members of the Union des Jeunes Musulmans
announce in 1987 their goal to “live our spirituality in the open and not in a reclusive way in the
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private sphere.”140 IGMG maintains that “Islam is a social and individual way of living, the
influence of which certainly does not end at a mosque’s doorstep.”141 Likewise, MCB strives for
“a multi-faith, pluralist society with a conscious policy of recognizing that people’s cultural and
faith identities are not merely a private matter but have public implications.”142 Each
organization echoes the words of the influential leader of the London-based European Council
for Fatwa and Research, al-Qaradawi, who asserts: “No Muslim who believes that Islam is the
word of God can conceive that this great religion will ever accept being a mere appendix to
socialism or any other ideology.”143
In contrast to Islamophobes, Islamists, and Euro-Islamists, all of whom view Europe as
essentially a finished product, post-Islamists see it as a work in progress, indeed, one in need of
considerable work and progress. For them, Islam represents a wellspring of universal values such
as the fundamental equality of all humans before God, humility and respect for God’s creation
(environment), individual responsibility and industry, but also sympathy, aid and justice for the
downtrodden and unfortunate, that if adapted and applied to modern life can greatly improve
it.144 The spiritual, and thereby the ethical, dimension of life has been neglected as Europeans
have become mesmerized by the admittedly impressive physical accomplishments and comforts
of modernization. “We do not want modernization without soul or values; we want ethical
reform. We want to transform the world in the name of the justice and human dignity that, sadly,
are often forgotten in the current inhumane global (dis)order.”145 For Ramadan, national modern
identity represents a jejune substitute for genuinely religious identity. The former teaches
humans “how” to exist but not, like Islam, “why” they exist. It leaves them lacking a deeper
meaning and purpose with which to assess rather than merely accept the latest trends and
fashions of modern life. It no less than robs humankind of its proper and proportionate
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relationship to the rest of the universe by anthropomorphically and mistakenly placing man at the
center of that universe.146
Post-Islamists do not pretend to have all the answers. They underscore dialogue. UOIF’s
commitment to open dialogue is typical of other organizations with post-Islamist leanings:
“Diversity is inherent in human nature. The UOIF believes that dialogue is the best way to
achieve mutual recognition among members of a common society. The UOIF opposes a
rupturing discourse based on the hatred and rejection of others…The only acceptable approach to
dealing with the emergence of problems of misunderstanding is dialogue, explanation and
education.”147 Post-Islamists do not seek to Islamize Europe, but they do demand a prominent
place for Islam at the dialogue table and therefore in public life. They do insist on the need to
formulate through dialogue what Ramadan calls a “new ‘We.’”148 This is a new understanding of
what it means to be European that includes rather than excludes Islam, that views “Muslims –
with their spirituality, ethics and creativity” -- as a “contribution” rather than a threat. This will
demand recognition that
European societies have been changing, and the presence of Muslims has forced
them to experience an even greater diversity of cultures. As a result, a European
identity has evolved that is open, plural and constantly in motion, thanks to the
cross-fertilisation between reclaimed cultures of origin and the European cultures
that now include new (Muslim) citizens.149
CONCLUSION
Social scientists tend to prefer order to messiness. They are wont to design models and
typologies that endeavor to make sense of a complicated reality. In the comparative study of both
immigration and secularism the prevailing paradigm underscores national models and path
dependency. As noted above, the French are said to follow a republican model of immigrant
incorporation, the British a multicultural model, the Germans an ethno-national model.150 As far

28

as secularism is concerned, France practices strict separation, Britain weak establishment,
Germany institutionalized neutrality.151
Despite admitted advantages, such modeling with the nation-state as the central unit of
analysis has at least two drawbacks.152 By accentuating differences, it glosses over similarities
across nation-states. As demonstrated above, most governments of Europe oversee multiple
forms of secularism at once. Bias in favor of Christianity and against Islam exists everywhere,
attempts to encourage Euro-Islam can be found in most lands, and both Islamism and postIslamism are Europe-wide phenomena. The nation-state models paradigm also exaggerates the
extent of normative consensus within each nation-state. Yet, above we encountered vehement
debate in each land regarding how best to incorporate Islam and Muslims -- debate, moreover,
that tends to take on similar expressions from one country to the next. Islamophobes are no more
confined to, say, France than Islamists are to the United Kingdom or the Netherlands.
Furthermore, this pan-European discourse over the proper form secularism should take
has a fragilizing effect. The diversity of avidly but plausibly defended stances weakens
conviction and confidence. The resulting solicitude regarding one’s preferred stance occasions
philosophically inconsistent but politically pragmatic combinations of vying points of views.
Official sponsors of Euro-Islam nevertheless adopt an Islamophobic suspicion of Muslims. TheWest-hating Islamists employ tropes stemming from postmodern analysis rooted in Nietzschean
nihilism. Post-Islamists combine approval with criticism of modern European life. Fragilization
facilitates policy messiness as the prospect of and perhaps need for an overarching consensus
fade. Once considered largely settled, secularism in Europe today represents a complex,
contested, protean, social and political phenomenon that through ongoing transformation is
profoundly altering the way Europeans view and experience religion in the 21st century.
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